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COMMENTS

(A SERVICE FOR RETURNVETERANs)*-The developments in the law of evidence in the war
years have not been great. They have been mainly along the lines of
tests for witnesses, the use of confessions in criminal cases, the interEVIDENCE-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

ING

* This comment is the first in the series of comments on Recent Developments
in the Various Fields of Law, described in 44 MtcH. L. REV. 149 (1945).
Within the last five years the Law Review has published other items, some of
which have been cited by Professor Tracy in the present comment, dealing with
developments in the law of evidence. They are as follows: Articles: Donaldson, "Medical Facts that Can and Cannot Be Proved by X-ray," vol. 41, p. 875 (1943); Schwartz,
"Problems of Proof in Claims for Recovery for Dermatitis," vol. 41, p. 893 (1943);
Hartwig, "Congressional Enactment of Uniform Judicial Notice Act," vol. 40, p. 174
(1941); Comments: Police regulations by rules of evidence, vol. 42, p. 679 (1944);
Police regulations by rules of evidence-results of the McNabb case, vol. 42, p. 909
(1944); Decision Notes: Admissibility of hospital records as business entries, vol. 40,
p. uo5 (1942); Admissibility of age in hospital records as business entry, vol. 43,
p. 4II (1944); Admissibility of defendant's refusal to submit to blood test for intoxication, vol. 40, p. 907 (1942); Actions against shipowners for loss of cargo--burden of
proof of seaworthiness, vol. 41, p. 693 (1943).-EJ.
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pretation by the courts of the so-called "Business Entries" Act and the
adoption by the American Law Institute of a proposed Code of Evidence.
Blo~d Tests to Determine Paternity
Since it has been thoroughly demonstrated by scientists that blood
groupings and their inheritance may be conclusive to determine certain
negative facts and the courts have shown their willingness to accept
the established conclusions of the scientists, evidence as to blood tests
has continued to be acceptable in cases involving paternity.1 In certain
jurisdictions, the courts, while not challenging the scientific conclusiveness of the tests, have refused to compel a ·party to submit to physical
examination to procure the blood sample.2 There has been, however,
an increasing tendency to provide for such an examination either by
statute 8 or by other rule.4
The remaining difficulty in demonstrating the conclusiveness of
such tests has been the unwillingness of certain courts to decide that
testimony of experts as to the results of. the application of the tests raises
anything more than a question of fact for the jury.5 There is here involved again the old question of the power and the duty of the court
to direct a verdict for the proponent of the evidence when such evidence was clear, positive, direct and undisputed, was given by an
unimpeached witness and there were no facts or circumstances in the
record which might throw doubt upon the truth of the testimony
given.6 In those jurisdictions that do not permit a judge to consider,
as conclusive on the jury, testimony of uncontradicted and unimpeached
experts that a certain person could not have been the father of a certain
child,1 apparently the only thing that a trial judge can do to avoid
what he feels may be a miscarriage of justice, will be to submit the
question of parentage to the jury and, if the jury returns a verdict
Comment, Admissibility of blood-group test, by M. J. Miller, 32 M1cH. L. REv.
987 (1934). Later cases admitting the evidence are: Matter of Swahn, 158 Misc. i7,
285 N.Y. Supp. 235 (19'36); State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E. (2d) 428
(1938). Commonwealth v. Visocki, 23 Pa. D. & C. 103 (1935); State v. Damm, 64
S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936); Euclide v. State, 231 Wis. 616, 286 N.W. 3
(1939).
2
See cases cited in note to W1cMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2220 (1940).
8
Examples of such statutes are Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7035; N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1941) tit. 14, § 126-a; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 166.105.
4
E.g., Federal Court Rule No. 35.
5
Arais v. K~lensnikoff, IO Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P. (2d) 1043 (1937); State v.
Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E. (2d) 428 (1938).
6
Olsen v. Hoffmann, 175 Minn. 287, 221 N.W. IO (1928); Jerke v. Delmont
State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
§ 2495 (1940).
7
E.g., California (See note 5, supra).
1
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contrary to the testmony believed by the trial judge to be conclusive,
to set aside the verdict and order a new trial.8
Deception Tests
Continued pressure has been brought upon the courts to compel
them to accept the results of certain "lie detector" tests as applied by
experts to witness.es, usually in cases involving crime. The courts have
continued to resist such pressure and have refused to admit the evidence, upon the ground that as yet the experts interested in that science
have not been willing to assure the courts that they themselves consider
suc!J. tests to be conclusive in their results.9 While certain lower courts
are said to have admitted evidence of the application of deception tests,
introduced by stipulation of the parties,1° in only one reported case
has a court admitted the evidence against objection. That was a lower
court ruling where the evidence was offered by the defendant of the
application of the test to himself.11 It should be noted, however, that
the only witness who testified on that subject in that case, was the
scientist who conducted the test and he was apparehtly willing to go
the whole distance in its support, as he testified that it was his firm
conviction that the test was r oo per cent efficient and accurate in the
detection of deception. If and when scientists, as a whole, will go that
far, the courts will doubtless be willing to receive such evidence, but
until the scientists do so state, the courts can be. expected to continue to
adhere to the position that they have heretofore taken on this subject.
Tests to Determine Intoxication
Scientists are apparently agreed that a state of intoxication can be
determined by the alcoholic content of the blood and that the concentration of alcohol in the blood can be ascertained, not only by blood
samples but by a chemical analysis of such other bodily substances as
urine, saliva, breath, and cerebral spinal fluid. 12 Therefore, there is
little difficulty in convincing the courts of the admissibility of evidence
of such tests and their results.18 The principal difficulties in obtaining
the substances for such tests and in offering in evidence the results of
the tests have been the constitutional privilege against self incrimination, and, where the test was administered by a physician, the physicianpatient privilege.
8 That procedure was followed by the trial judge in State v. Wright, 59 Ohio
App. 191, 17 N.E. (2d) 428 (1938), and his order granting the new trial was not
disturbed by the Court .of Appeals.
.
9
37 M1cH. L. REV. II41 (1939).
10 See 53 HARV. L. REV. 285 at 293, note 57 (1939).
11 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. SI, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 348 (1938).
12 Ladd and Gibson, "The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication," 24 lowA L. REv. 191 (1939).
18
Ibid.
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While, in certain jurisdictions, the courts have sustained the claim
of privilege against self incrimination as to anything gained by an
examination of the defendant's person,14 yet two quite recent drunken
driving cases have overruled such contention and have sustained the
admissibility of the laboratory tests for intoxication.15 The question of
whether the physician-patient privilige will bar the admission of such
evidence depends first, of course, upon whether there is such statutory
privilege in the particular jurisdiction and, generally, whether the information was obtained during curative treatment.16

Conjessions in Criminal Cases
This subject has become greatly complicated in recent years by
the extraordinary decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the McNabb case. 11 In that case the Court ruled that confessions or
admissions of crime made by the accused in custody without having
been brought before a magistrate as required by law, are inadmissible
in evidence. The decision was not based upon the argument that the
confession was made under compulsion, in fact it can be assumed from
the fact stated, that the confession was made without compulsion, but
its admission was barred simply because the officers of justice were
themselves disregarding the law.
This decision, upon its publication, was severely criticized,18 and the
Attorney General declared it to be a serious blow against law enforcement.10 Nevertheless, the lower federal courts and many state courts
have felt themselves compelled to follow it. 20 However, certain subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have cast doubt on just how
far the Court really meant to go in the McNabb case, so that the state
of the law on this question appears now to be in more or less confusion.
On the same day that the Court handed down its decision in the
1-1 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); People v. Corder, 244
Mich. 274 ,221 N.W. 309 (1928); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405
(1909). These were all rape cases and the examination of the defendant in each case
was to ascertain whether he was suffering from a certain venereal disease found in the
prosecuting witness.
15
State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937); State v. Gatton, 60
Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E. (2d) 265 (1938).
16 For a thorough discussion of these two privileges see the article by Ladd and
Gibson, "The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication," 24
lowA L. REv. 191 (1939). Also, see note in 53 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1939).
17
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943).
18 56 HARV. L. REv. 1008 (1943); 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1944); id. 909.
19
H. Hearings on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong. 1st sess., p. 46 ff. (1944) (Committee
on Judiciary).
20
See long list of cases cited in SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS, under 318
U.S. 332.
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McNabb case, it decided the case of Anderson v. United States. 21 In
that case, certain defendants were arrested by a state sher#f without a
warrant, the prisoners being charged with dynamiting power lines
during a strike. The prisoners were not arraigned before a magistrate
as required by state law. While they were being held by the state
sheriff, certain federal agents arrived to make an investigation of the
crime (the power lines dynamited belonged to the Tennessee Valley
Authority, a federal agency) and, in the course of their questioning of
the prisoners, six of them confessed to having committed the crime.
The men were indicted and convicted in the United States district
court. On appeal, the conviction was reversed on the ground that
error was made in admitting in evidence the confessions so made; that,
although the conduct of the federal officers was not illegal, their collaboration with the state officers tainted the evidence and rendered the
confessions inadmissible under the principle announced in the McNabb
case.

A year later, the Court was confronted with a somewhat similar
problem in the Mitchell case 22 but that time the court had had the
benefit of the criticisms by law writers of its decision in the McNabb
case and was apparently inclined to be more cautious, for it sustained
the admission of a confession challenged under the theory of the
McNabb case.
In the Mitchell case the prisoner was arrested charged with burglary in the District of Columbia. He was taken immediately to the
police station where he made an apparently spontaneous confession,
admitting the burglary and stating where the stolen property could be
found. Thereafter a period of eight days elapsed before the prisoner
was arraigned before a committing magistrate. The trial court admitted the confession; the court of appeals reversed under the doctrine
of the McNabb case. On appeal by the government,. the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and sustained the
conviction. The Court stated that, although such lengthy detention
without arraignment was illegal, the illegality of the detention did not
retroactively change the circumstances under which the prisoner made
the disclosures and that the use of such confession by the government
would not be "use of the fruits of wrong-doing'' by government
officers; that the power of the court to refuse to admit evidence is not
to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct by law
enforcement officers. The Court also added, as an explanation of its
position, that in these recent decisions, it had been dealing with the
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials in the federal courts and
suggested that review by the Supreme Court of state convictions pres21
22

318 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 599 (1943).
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896 (1944).

1 945]

COMMENTS

453

ented a very different situation; that in those cases the sole authority of
the court is to ascertain whether such a state court violated the basic
safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A month after its decision in the Mitchell case, the court, in the
case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee 28 faced the problem last suggested, viz.,
the legality of a conviction in the state court based o~ a confession
which had been illegally obtained. In that case the defendant had been
convicted in a state court of the crime of murder and the conviction had
been affirmed by the supreme court of the state. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the conviction on the
ground that the court had admitted in evidence an alleged confession
by the defendant, which confession this Court found not to have been
voluntary. Three justices dissented and it is interesting to note that
among the dissenters was Justice Frankfurter, who had written the
majority opinion in the McNabb, Anderson and Mitchell cases.
A month later came the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Lyons v. Oklahoma. 24 There the defendant had been convicted
in a state court of the crime of murder and the conviction had been
affirmed by the court of appeals of the state. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The ground urged for reversal was that there had
been admitted in evidence a confession of. the accused; that this confession followed by only about twelve hours an earlier confession that
had been induced by third degree methods apparently so bad that such
first confession was never offered in evidence; and that the fear instilled
in the prisoner by the coercion that resulted in the first confession continued to result in the second confession. The court reviewed the
record and found that there was evidence which, if believed, would
justify a court in finding that the second confession was voluntary;
that such finding had been made by the trial court and affirmed by
the state court of appeals and the Supreme Court would not hold that
there had been a lack of due process. Three justices dissented.

Admissibility of Business Entries
The two problems of admissibility of business entries that have
apparent.1y caused the courts the most difficulty in recent years, have
?een those of hospital records and reports of employees to their superiors.
In a comment in the Michigan Law Review 25 there appeared an
exhaustive study of hospital records and their admissibility in evidence.
It was there shown that only four states had definitely held hospital
records to be inadmissible; that fourteen states, either by statute or
28
24
2

~

322 U.S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 928 (1944).
322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1210 (1944).
38 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1939).
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decision had admitted hospital records as business entries; that the
highest courts in six other states had expressed a willingness to admit
such records but, in the particular case brought before them, there
had not been sufficient evidence of authentication; that in four other
states there were statutes under which it would seem that the evidence
should be admissible; and that in the remaining states there had been
no decisions or statutes one way or the other. It was also discussed in
the comment that, of the courts that had admitted hospital entries, not
all had been willing to go the whole way and admit the!Il for every
purpose, some courts holding that they may be admitted to prove facts
stated therein but not to prove opinions.
An attempt will be made here to discuss only those decisions that
have been handed down since the above mentioned comment.
In People v. Kohlmeyer 26 defendant in a prosecution for robbery
pleaded insanity. As bearing on that defense, he offered copies of a
hospital record in Wisconsin relating to his paternal grandmother.
These records showed that the grandmother suffered from insanity of
the manic-'depressive type which other evidence showed might be
inherited. An objection to the admission of the evidence was sustained
in the trial court. The court of appeals reversed this ruling as error,
holding that the diagnoses of the grandmother's condition were "records of an act, transaction, occurrence or event" within the language
and meaning of the Model Statute for the admission of business
entries.
Meise/man v. Crown Heights Hospital 21 was an action for damages for malpractice. The trial judge excluded the records of the
hospital on the ground that the physician who made the entries was
in court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that such ruling was
error.
In Roberto v. Nielson 28 a hospital record was offered in evidence
reading as follows:
"C. C. Auto accident. The patient is too limited in vocabulary,
and too groggy from drink and paralydehide to give a very good
story, but evidently, after a day of beer and wine drinking, he was
somehow involved in an auto accident. The actuality of the coma
was not elicited, but the patient was brought in by police.
"Pt [patient] is very incooperative. Adequate determination
of mental state is impossible ( states that he has been drunk and
says that he has had an injection in arm)." 29
26

284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E. (2d) 490 (1940).
285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E. (2d) 367 (1941).
28
262 App. Div. 1035, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 334 (1941), affirmed without opinion,
288 N.Y. 581, 42 N.E. (2d) 27 (1942).
29
288 N.Y. 581 at 582, 42 N.E. (2d) 27 (1942). (Italics the court's.)
,

27
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The trial judge excluded the evidence and the appellate division
reversed, holding that only the portion above italicized should have
been rejected.
In an illuminating opinion in a lower court in the case of Del Re
v. City of New York,3° Justice Steinbrink laid down a very logical
rule to apply in these cases. The infant plaintiff was injured while
riding in a New York subway. He claimed that the train made an
"unusual" stop; the defendant claimed that plaintiff was pushed by
another boy while roughhousing. A hospital record was offered in
evidence which stated inter alia "the patient was riding in subway
when it came to a sudden stop at 25th Ave. and 86th." In holding
that the admission of the record was error, the justice said "it was the
business of the hospital to diagnose the patient's condition, not to
record a statement learned from an unidentified source, describing the
manner in which the plaintiff's injuries were sustained." .
· Reed v. Order of United Commercial Travellers 31 was an action
on a fraternal benefit certificate. The defense was that death was from
injuries received while insured was intoxicated, there being a clause
in the· certificate forbidding recovery in such a case. Defendant offered
in evidence a portion of a hospital record stating that the patient "was
reacting very well--still apparently under the influence of alcohol."
It was held that the evidence was properly admitted.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has continued consistently to
hold that, although hospital records are admissible under the Model
Act concerning business entries, the portions of such records which do
not refer to acts, transactions, occurrences or events incident to treatment are inadmissible. 32
The other problem of the admissibility of entries under the Model
Act that has occasioned much discussion in recent years, is that of an
accident report made by an employee to the corporation by which he
was employed. The leading case has been Palmer v. Hoffman.~ Following a grade-crossing accident, the engineer of the train, who died
before the trial, made a written statement in a freight office of the railroad, where he was interviewed by an assistant superintendant of the
road and a representative of the state Public Utility Commission. The
statement was offered in evidence by the railroad under the Model
30
180 Misc. 525, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 825 (1943). Accord: Dickson v. Gastl, 64
Ohio App. 346, 28 N.E. (2d) 688 (1940).
31
•
(C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 252.
32
Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N.E. 706 (1937); Sadjak v. ParkerWolverine Co., 281 Mich. 84, 274 N.W. 719 (1937); Valenti v. Mayer, 301 Mich.
551, 4 N.W. (2d) 5 (1942); Harrison v. Lorenz, 303 Mich. 382, 6 N.W. (2d) 554
(1942). Two recent law revi_ew articles dealing with this subject are 30 CoRN. L. Q.
454 _(1944) and 23 TEX. L. REV. 178 (1945).
33
318 U.S. 109, 63 S. Ct. 477 (1943).
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Act. The trial judge refused to admit it and the circuit court of
appeals affirmed, one judge vigorously dissenting. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling, saying:
"We µiay assume that if the statement was made 'in the regu, lar course' of business, it would satisfy the other provisions of the ·
Act. But we do not think that it was made 'in the regular course'
of business within ·the meaning of the Act. The business of the
petitioners is the railroad business. That business like other enter-·
prises entails the keeping of numerous books and records essential
to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation. Tho~gh suc;h
books and records were considered reliable and trustworthy for
major decisions in the industrial and business world, their use in
litigation was greatly circumscribed .or hedged about by the hearsay rule-restrictions which greatly increased the time and cost
of maki11g the. prqof. ~here those who made the records were
nun:ierous .. • .. It was that problem which started the movement
towards adoption of legislation embodying the principles of the
present Act. . . . And the legislative history of the Act indicates
the same purpose.
·
"The en~neer's statement which was held inadmissible in
this case falls into quite a different category. It is not a record
made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business.
An .accident report may a~ect that business in the sense that it
affords information on which the management may act. It is
not, however, typical of entries made systemati!=ally or as a matter
of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions
with others, .or to pi;-ovide internal controls. The conduct of a
busine~s commonly entails the payment of tort claims incurred by
the negligen<;:e of its employees. But the fact that a C()mpany
makes. a business out of recqrding its employees' versions of their
accidents does not put those statements in the class of records
made 'in the r!!gular- course' of the business within the meaning
of the Act .. If it did, _then any law office in the land could follow
the same course, since.business as defined in the Act includes the
professions. We would then hav_e a real perversion of a raje
designed to facilitate admission of records which experience has
shown to .be qui~e trustworthy. Any business by installing a
regular system for recording and. preserving its version of accidents for which it was potentially liable could qualify those
reports under the Act. The result would be that the Act would
cover any system of recording events or· occurrences provided it
was 'regular' and though it had little or nothing to do with the
management or operation of the business as such. Preparation of
cases for trial by virtue of being a -'business' or inc;idental thereto
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would obtain the benefits of this liberalized version of the ·early,
shop book rule. The probability of trustworthiness of records
because they were routine reflections of the day to day operations
of a business would be forgotten as the basis of the rule. • • . We
cannot so completely empty the words of the Act of their historic·
meaning. If the Act is to be extended to apply not only to .a
'regular course' of a business but also to any 'regular .course' of
conduct which may have some relationship to business, Congress
not this Court must extend it. Such a major change which opens
wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination should not be
left to implication. Nor is it any answer to say that Congress has
provided in the Act that the various circumstances of the making
of the record should affect its weight, not its admissibility. That
provision comes into play only in case the 9ther requirements.of
the Act are met.
"In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are n<;>t·
for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business.
Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of
lading and the like, these reports are calculated for use essentially.
in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in liti""
gating, not in railroading.
"It is, of course, not _for us to take these reports out of :t~
Act if Congress has put them in. But there is nothing in the background of the law on which this Act was built or in its legislative
history which suggests for a moment that the business of preparing cases for trial should be included_."u
. This . decision has been both criticized 35 and defended 86 by. law
review writers and the courts have not agreed in their application· of
the principles there applied, as evidenced by two later decisions, both
having to do with admissibility of hospital records.
New York Life Insurance Company v. Taylor 37 was an action
on the double indemnity provision of a life insurance policy.·· The
insured was killed by a fall from a stair well in Walter Reed.Hospital
and an issue in the case was whether his fall was accidental. To sup.:.
port its defense of suicide, the defendant offered the -hospital rec;ord
in the insured's case. It consisted of: (I) a history of. the case;. ( 2)
reports on three operations performed on the patient; (3) reports
of conversations indicating his. intention to kill himself; ( 4) :r:eport
of a conversation by the attending physician with a psychiatrist; (5)
Id. at I 11-114.
56 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1942).
86 43 CoL. L. REv. 392 (1943).
37 (C.C.A. D.C. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 297.34
35
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report of a psychiatrist; ( 6) transcript and findings of a hospital board
of inquiry as to the cause of the insured's death. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that, although some parts of the
record were unquestionably admissible, other parts, particularly the
conversations with the insured and the reports of the psychiatrist, were
clearly inadmissible, saying:
· " ... Diagnosis of a psychoneurotic state involves conjecture
and opinion. It must therefore be subjected to the safeguards of
cross-examination of the physician who makes it..•. Some diagnoses are a matter of observation, others are a matter of judgment,
still others are a matter of pure conjecture." 88
The court cited Palmer v. Hoffman.
: A short time later, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
District in the case of Buckminster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,39 a- proceeding to review a decision of the Tax Court, holding
that a certain gift was. made in contemplation of death, had before
it the question of admissibility of a hospital record. The report does
not show the nature "of the record, but it was claimed to be inadmissible under the decision of New York Life Insurance Company v.
Taylor. The court held that the hospital record was properly admitted,
saying "we· do not agree with the way in which Palmer v. Hoffman
was interpreted in the Taylor case." 40

·Parol Evidence R1tle
A rather scathing attack was made upon the parol evidence rule
in the opinion by Judge Frank of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in the recent case of Zell v. American Seating
Company. 41 It could pass as the opinion of one judge if it were not for
the extraordinary history 9f the case in the Supreme Court.
The action was one brought by an individual against a corporation
for a· commission alleged to have been earned in obtaining war contracts for the defendant. The case came before the trial court on
aefendarit's motion , for
summary judgment. The complaint and
biH of particulars showed that defendant, by letter addressed to plain'ti:ff,- the terms of which were .accepted by plaintiff, employed plaintiff
as· :its representative to · obtain contracts for the manufacture of war
supplies, the employment to be for a period of three months at a
samry of '$ 1000 per month, "such. payment to be in full for. your
s~r;vices and expenses .and coqipensation for all work done on our
behalf during such period." The contract was twice extended for

a

Id. at 304, 306.
.
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 147 F. (2d) 331.
40 Id. at 3 34.
n (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 641.
38

39
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additional periods of three months each and the agreed compensation
was duly paid plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged, however, that the real contract between the parties was an oral one, under the terms of which
plaintiff was to be paid for his services $ I ooo per month in any
event and, if he were successful, plaintiff was to receive a further sum
in an amount not to be less than 3 per cent nor ·more than 8 per cent
of the "purchase price of said contracts," the exact amount to be later
determined by the parties; that when the written contract was drafted,
the provision for the extra compensation was purposely omitted, on
the insistence of defendant's president, "to avoid any public stigma
which might result from putting such provision in writing," there
having been some· public criticism of contingent fee war contracts;
but that it was expressly agreed that the· oral contract and not the
written was the real contract between the parties. Plaintiff claimed to
have procured for the defendant, war contracts aggregating $5,956~000
on which plaintiff claimed a commission of 3 per cent.
·The trial judge granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that evidence as to the oral contract could not be received to
contradict and vary the terms of the writing.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that
the contract having been made in Michigan and the parol evidence
rule being a rule of substantive law, the law of Michigan must be
applied, and the decisions of that state showed that evidence is admissible to prove that a written agreement executed as a mere sham lacks
real efficacy and that extrinsic parol evidence will always be received
on that issue.42
After so deciding, the opinion of the judge went on, however, for
several pages in criticism of the parol evidence rule. The following
quotation from the opinion shows the attitude of the court:
"Candor compels the admission that, were we enthusiastic
devotees of that rule, we might so construe the record as to bring
this case within the rule's scope; we could dwell on the fact that
plaintiff, in his complaint, states that the acceptance of his offer
'was partly oral and partly contained' in the October 3 r writing,
and could then hold that, as that writing unambiguously covers
the item of commissions, the plaintiff is trying to use extrinsic
evidence to 'contradict' the writing. But the plaintiff's affidavit,
if accepted as true and liberally construed, makes it plain that
the parties deliberately intended the October 3 r writing to be a
misleading, untrue, statement of their real agreement. . . . We
thus construe the record because we do not share defendant's
~ 2 The opinion states that that is the rule "virtually everywhere." The writer is
unwilling to concede the correctness of that statement. Sec 33 M1cH. L. REV. 410
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,belief.that the rule is so beneficient, so promotive of the administration of justice, and so. necessary to business stability, that it
should be given the widest possible application. The truth is
that the rule does but little to achieve the ends it supposedly
serves. . . . We see no good reason why we should strain to
interpret the record facts here to bring them within such a rule."1-S
The Suprem·e Court granted certiorari and after argument the
case was aisposed of in a memorandum opinion which read as follows:
"Per Curiam. In this case two members of the court think
.that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be
affirmed. Seven are of opinion that the judgment should be
reversed and the judgment of the I?istrict Court affirmed-four
because proof of the contract alleged in respondent's affidavits
on t~e motion for summary judgment is precluded by the applicable state parol evidence rule, and three because the contract is
co11trar:y to public policy and void . . . [ citing cases]. The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed." 44
Quaere: What will the Supreme Court do with the next cast that
comes ·before it involving a clash between the parol evidence rule
and the "written instrument executed as a sham" doctrine?
Model Code of Evidence
In I 942 the American Law Institute formally approved for publication its "Code of Evidence," its first avowed venture into the field
of codification. It was the result of several years' work by a committee
of experts appointed by the Institute to draft a Code that would supersede the present law of Evidence which has beeri judge-made and
which has the imperfections with which all lawyers are familiar.
The theory of the Code and its detailed provisions have been
widely. discussed in legal literature since that time. Certain of its
draftsmen have written vigorously in its support.4:; Dean Wigmore,
who . was originally named Chief Consultant in the drafting of the
Code, shortly before his untimely death published an article which he
called a "Dissent" in which article he vigorously criticized the plan
of the code and certain of its provisions.46 One writer, to avoid the
(C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 641 at 644-645, 649-650.
American Seating Co. v. Zell, 322 U.S. 709, 64 S. Ct. 1053 (1944).
45 Morgan, "The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute,"
27 A.B.A.J. 539,587,694, 742 (1941); Hale, 1941 CAL. S.B.J. 153. Ladd, "Modern Thinking Upon Evidence-A Modern Code," 17 TENN. L. REv. IO (1941);
McCormick, "The New Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute," 20 TEX.
L. REV. 661 (1942).
46 28 A.B.A.J. 23-8 (1942); For mother article in criticism see Challener, "The
Proposed Code of Evidence," 13 Pa. B.A.Q. 162 (1942).
43
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difficulty in attempting to have the Code adopted by forty-eight
different legislatures has argued that the Code can and should 'be
adopted by the courts, either in presence of rule-making power heretofore granted to them by the legislature, or as an exercise of their
inherent power.47
While a large number of bar associations, either at bar meetings
or through regular or special committees, have been engaged in studying
the Code and the problems of whether it should be adopted in their
particular state, the writer has not yet heard that it has been adopted
in toto in any jurisdiction.
The feeling of the Bar, in general, so far as can be determined
from reading the reports of bar meetings, is apparently that the Code
contains much that is valuable and certain sections of it will doubtless
be widely adopted, but that its adoption as a whole to supplant the
existing law of Evidence would not be wise.48
John E. Tracy t

Lobingier, "Our 'Model Code of Evidence,'" 91 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 581
(1943).
48 18th Report of Judicial Council of Mass., Dec. 1942.
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